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PREFACE 
The purpose of this essay is to summarize and distill the 
informative presentations and lively discussion of this 
Conference. While noting the names of speakers, in general we 
have not tried to attribute ideas and factual points in great 
detail. We have added some factual material, mainly in tabular 
and chart form, to provide concrete documentation of some of the 
main points made. 
We benefitted enormously from the materials presented by the 
speakers and the contributions from the floor. We also thank our 
colleagues at the Japan Society and particularly Jonathan McHale 
of the Center on Japanese Economy and Business, for their 
research and related assistance in the preparation of this essay. 
Nonetheless, the responsibility for organizing the materials 
presented and for interpreting the views expressed at the 
Conference rests solely with us. 
Hugh Patrick 
Frances Rosenbluth 
Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business 
Columbia University 
INTRODUCTION: BASIC SOURCES OF CHANGE IN THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 
Japan now faces the challenge of the third period of major 
restructuring of its economy since World War II. The first 
involved the reconstruction of Japan's war-torn economy and its 
transformation to civilian goods production. The second 
restructuring was in response to the huge, unexpected oil price 
hikes, especially in 1973-74 but also in 1979-80. The current 
transformation is in direct response to the unprecedentedly great 
appreciation of the yen from its low point in early 1985. Japan 
now faces the combined pressures of a stronger yen, competition 
from newly industrializing countries and other low-cost 
producers, and continued demands from its trading partners to 
reduce its continuingly huge current account surpluses. 
A strong yen in itself poses Japan with a considerable 
challenge, particularly because of the rapidity with which the 
yen has appreciated. The value of the yen, which was 2 60 to the 
dollar as recently as February 1985, has doubled in value in less 
than three years and seems to be rising further. At about 130 to 
the dollar (as of December 3, 1987), the yen is almost three 
times the postwar value of 3 60 to the dollar which persisted over 
20 years until the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system 
finally collapsed in early 1973. 
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Japanese industrial restructuring has two, interrelated 
dimensions. It involves major changes in industrial output and 
employment — shifts from economically inefficient to efficient 
industries and from the production of manufactured (and 
agricultural) goods to the production of domestically-consumed 
services. For Japan it also involves a reduction of its trade 
and current account surpluses, since they are intolerably large 
for the United States and other major nations. This second 
factor has become the catalyst propelling rapid transformation of 
Japan's industrial structure. 
Events of the past fifteen years, both at home and abroad, 
in some respects masked, retarded, and even distorted the 
adjustments inevitable in Japan, and greatly exacerbated the 
degree and rapidity of adjustment in which Japan finds itself 
today. Normally, changes in the structure of production is an 
ongoing process. It occurs with the development of new products 
and other technological improvements, differential changes in 
demand of consumers and other users of goods and services, and 
the loss of competitiveness in some sectors as wage rates rise 
and producers abroad develop low-cost productive capacity. 
However, the pressures — business, economic, and political — on 
the sudden restructuring of the Japanese economy have been so 
great in the past two years that a sense of crisis has newly 
emerged in Japan. That Japan was able to postpone real 
adjustment earlier makes the challenge for Japan all the greater 
in the second half of the 1980s. 
What have been the underlying forces and events which have 
rather suddenly resulted in such great yen appreciation and 
forced major structural adjustment upon Japan? By 1970 Japan had 
overcome its chronic balance of payments constraint and, as a 
consequence of superfast growth of manufactured goods production 
and high savings rate, was beginning to enter an era of 
structural trade surpluses and capital exports. The oil crisis 
of 1973-74 brought that incipient trend to a sudden halt; 
economic growth decelerated sharply, business optimism was 
doused, the high price of oil pushed the balance of payments into 
deficit once again and meant Japan had to export even more to pay 
for its rising oil bill. Moreover, domestic demand grew only 
moderately, a condition that persisted through the mid-1980s. 
Japan's response was in many respects highly successful. 
The yen naturally depreciated relative to the dollar and other 
currencies. Export industries came even more into their own; by 
1977-78 the balance of payments was in current account surplus 
once again and the yen eventually appreciated and even overshot 
its equilibrium rate. The government stimulated domestic demand 
by vigorously expansionary budget deficits until 1980, when the 
second oil crisis and fear of excessive government deficit 
spending brought a contractionary change in policy. 
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Japan was lucky in its timing. Beginning in 1981 the United 
States began a fiscal-monetary policy mix which succeeded in 
halting inflation and carried the American economy through the 
1982 recession, but resulted in a seriously overvalued dollar 
and, concomitantly, undervalued yen. The consequence was the 
surge of American imports, met happily by Japanese exporters as 
well as all other foreign producers. As Ryuhei Wakasugi, 
Professor of Economics at Shinshu University, pointed out, 
increases in external demand (export growth less import growth) 
accounted for 35 percent of Japan's GNP growth between 1980-85. 
The surplus of domestic private saving over private investment 
was increasingly channelled into exports of goods, and with that 
exports of capital. Japan's current account surplus burgeoned, 
from $4.77 billion in 1981 to $85.8 billion in 1986. Moreover, 
the American share in Japan's growing exports, which had declined 
from one-third in the 1960s to 24.2 percent in 1980, increased 
dramatically to 38.5 percent by 1986. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3.) 
Other longer-run factors were at work which were masked in 
part by the low value of the yen. In Japan rising wage rates and 
disproportionately rapid productivity gains in certain 
manufacturing sectors produced widening gaps between competitive 
and non-competitive sectors; not just agriculture and 
distribution but energy-intensive and labor-intensive 
manufactures were increasingly economically inefficient. 
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Furthermore, low wage developing economies, especially among 
Japan's Asian neighbors, were rapidly expanding their capacity to 
produce competitively a widening range of manufactured goods. 
And Japan, in consequence of its new status as an economic power 
and signatory of the Tokyo and earlier rounds of multilateral 
tariff reductions, gradually but extensively lowered many of its 
official barriers on manufactured goods imports. The conditions 
were in place, once the yen did appreciate as the overvalued 
dollar declined precipitously from its early 1985 levels, for a 
major increase in low cost, labor intensive manufactured goods 
from developing countries. 
Japan's structure of production was distorted — too many 
exports and too many domestic goods competing with imports — and 
for too long. The resultant trade surplus was intolerable to the 
rest of the world, and rancorous international trade frictions 
were the unfortunate, if predictable, result. Japan now is being 
hoisted on the petard of its own success in manufacturing. Yen 
appreciation was inevitable, to create market pressures for firms 
and industries to adjust. And yen appreciation was exacerbated 
by the sharp decline in oil prices from late 1985, which improved 
Japan's terms of trade and real income but increased further the 
degree of structural adjustment required. 
However, the message of the Conference was by no means all 
gloom and doom. As Yutaka Kosai, President of the Japan Economic 
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Research Center noted, the Japanese word for crisis, kiki, is the 
combination of two Chinese characters meaning "danger" and 
"opportunity". Indeed, some interpreted Japan's current 
challenge to restructure quite positively, seeing it leading to a 
more efficient economy linked ever more closely to other nations 
through Japanese business direct investment as well as trade. 
THE JAPANESE EXPORT SECTORS' RESPONSE TO PRESSURES FOR CHANGE 
Japan's remarkable export growth in recent years has been 
concentrated in a small number of industries — automobiles, 
electrical machinery including consumer electronics, steel, 
precision machinery. The increase in exports of autos and 
electrical goods alone amounted to 45 percent of the increase in 
Japan's total exports between 1980-85, and 55.9 percent of the 
increase of Japanese exports to the American market. (See Tables 
4 and 5.) Not surprisingly, these industries became increasingly 
dependent on foreign markets, with exports exceeding 40 percent 
or more of total sales. Given the importance of these industries 
not only in Japan but in the United States and Western Europe, it 
is not surprising they have become the lightning rods of trade 
frictions. Moreover, these Japanese industries, even prior to 
yen appreciation, were beginning to lose competitiveness in 
simpler products to South Korea, Taiwan, and other newly 
developing countries. 
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Yen appreciation has severely affected the profitability of 
the industries, and accelerated the need to develop new corporate 
strategies in response to the changed economic environment. In 
general firms in each industry have pursued similar policies of 
upgrading product quality and mix and cutting costs at home, 
while increasing direct investment abroad in productive capacity 
— to developing countries for simple, labor-intensive products, 
and to the United States and the European Community in high tech 
products where being close to the market is important, or in 
goods in which import barriers are imposed or threatened. 
The Automobile Industry 
The Japanese automobile industry, which depended heavily on 
export growth between 1980 and 1985, has undergone a serious 
decline in profitability since 1985 due to the appreciation of 
the yen and intensified competition in the nearly saturated 
domestic market. Exports, a large portion of which went to the 
U.S., accounted for about a third of total sales for Japan's 
motor vehicle makers in 1985. (See Table 6) Autos amounted to 
20.4 percent of Japan's exports in 1986. The automobile 
industry's export growth in numbers of cars has been curbed since 
1981 when it agreed to "voluntary" export restraints (VERs) to 
the U.S., and subsequently to the European Community. 
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Table 7 Japanese Auto Makers' Voluntary Export Restraints 
with the U.S. 









Source: Chrysler Corporation. 
Even so, American imports of Japanese automobiles and parts 
amounted to $27.13 billion in 1986, some 3 3.12 percent of total 
U.S. imports from Japan. Japanese car makers have responded to 
the export ceilings by keeping prices high and by marketing more 
expensive cars overseas, resulting in high profits in the U.S. 
and Europe which since 1984 actually offset losses in Japan and 
kept a number of possibly marginal producers in business. 
One discussant suggested that the VERs meant that American 
auto buyers paid substantially higher prices, benefitting not 
only American producers but their Japanese (and European) 
competitors as well. The stronger yen, however, has eliminated 
the extraordinary export profits for Japanese car producers, and 
they have had to raise prices somewhat to prevent losses. 
Not surprisingly, Japanese producers did not raise prices by the 
full amount of the yen appreciation, in part to maintain market 
share and in part because they did not expect to keep earlier 
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profit margins indefinitely. The cumulative price increases of 
Japanese autos sold in the U.S. amounted to 5.7 percent in 
November 1985, 17.4 percent in November 1986, and 24.7 percent in 
November 1987.1 Nonetheless, total pretax profits of the 11 
Japanese automakers peaked in 1985 when they surpassed 1 trillion 
yen. In fiscal 1986 the combined earnings dropped to 800 billion 
yen, and are estimated to fall to 600 billion in fiscal 1987. 
Increasingly in the 1980s, Japanese automobile manufacturers 
have relocated production facilities in their export markets, 
particularly in the U.S. and Europe where the VERs make the 
political limits of exports most explicit. According to Chrysler 
Corporation Vice President R.A. Perkins, assembly at Japanese-
owned and jointly owned plants in the U.S. market is expected to 
approach 1 million units in 1987 and nearly 2.3 million units by 
1992. Even though Japanese auto makers apparently will export 
2 00,000 fewer units than their voluntary quota to the United 
States in 1987, because of loss of price competitiveness, Perkins 
expressed the American automobile industry concern that Japanese 
producers will try both to produce in the United States and to 
maintain export unit levels to the United States, and that this 
would create extraordinary pressures in an American market that 
is expected to be flat over the next several years. That would 
lead to further American pressure on Japanese firms to curb 
production somewhere. It was noted that the Ford Motor Company 
1
 From press releases compiled by Chrysler Corporation. 
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Chairman, Donald E. Peterson, had recently suggested the Japanese 
VER be reduced by 600,000 units to 1.7 million units in 1988. 
The Japanese automobile industry has so far avoided 
substantial work-force reduction and production cuts at home by 
reducing part-purchasing expenses, changing product designs, and 
trimming operating costs. Nissan, for example, cut 200 billion 
yen in costs after sliding into the red in the first six months 
of fiscal 1986. Some of the cost-cutting measures, however, may 
fall upon the less visible subcontractors, and it is too early to 
assess the results. 
In the discussion the question was raised as to how many 
Japanese car exports to the United States are profitable at 
current exchange rates. It was suggested that the American 
strategy of Japanse producers is to maintain market share by 
exports until U.S. production is on line. Thereafter for cost 
reasons they would have to reduce production in Japan. If so, 
and if this should extend to parts manufacturers as well, then 
the output and employment reductions in the Japanese automobile 
industry would be substantial. No one had a clear perception as 
to how hard restructural adjustment will hit the Japanese 
industry. 
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The Steel Industry 
Since its peak production of 119 million metric tons in 
1973, the Japanese steel industry has cut production more or less 
steadily in response to reduced demand at home and abroad. About 
3 0 percent of Japan's crude steel production is exported. (See 
Table 8.) The steel industry successfully coped with the oil 
price hikes and slower domestic growth of the 1970s by trimming 
production, reducing variable costs such as energy and raw 
materials, and focusing on technological innovation and high 
quality steel products. 
In early 1987 the Big Five Japanese steel companies 
announced plans to reduce their respective output and work force 
substantially over the next several years. Even though 
additional government expenditures of $37 billion for public 
works raised steel production by several million tons higher than 
originally anticipated in 1987, the longer term forecast still 
projects declining consumption in Japan, North America, and 
Europe. 
The sharp rise in the value of the yen since fall 1985 
poses an even greater challenge to the maturing Japanese steel 
industry. At current exchange rates, certain simple steel 
products imported from Korea or Taiwan are up to 30 to 40 percent 
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cheaper than domestically-produced steel. However, their supply 
capabilities are limited in the near-term, especially in light of 
high domestic demand due to rapid growth. Both countries, 
moreover, import high quality steel products from Japan. 
Toshio Nagashima, President of NKK America Inc., cited 
MITI's estimation that Japanese net exports will decline sharply, 
from 30 million tons in 1985 to about 22 million tons in 1990. 
At the same time, demand for steel in Japan is expected to drop 
from 74 million tons in 1985 to 68 million tons or less by 1990. 
The Japanese steel industry is bracing for a cut in steel 
production from the 1985 level of 105 million tons to 90 million 
tons by 1990. 
In restructuring plans announced in 1987, the 32 blast 
furnaces currently operated by the five major producers in Japan 
will be reduced to 25 by 1990, and the steel industry's work 
force of 142,000 will be cut by 30 percent. Nagashima said that 
NKK, for example, is planning to eliminate one half of its blast 
furnace capability at Ohgishima, which is considered to be the 
most modern steel plant in Japan. NKK will close certain rolling 
mills where there is duplication, and all production of large 
diameter welded pipe will be shifted to NKK's Fukuyama plant. 
A decade ago the Japanese steel industry was the most 
efficient and cost competitive in the world. The increase in 
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production in developing countries such as Korea and Brazil 
somewhat eroded the advantage of Japanese steel firms but they 
continued to be highly competitive in the American market. 
However, Japanese sales in tonnage terms to the United States 
have been restrained by various measures, the most recent being 
the orderly marketing agreement since 1984 to limit Japanese 
steel exports to about 6 percent of the U.S. steel market. While 
historically the United States has been the single largest market 
for Japanese steel exports (taking about one-fifth), China has 
become the largest importer of Japanese steel since 1983. 
One means of softening the impact of ceilings on sales in 
the U.S. has been to establish joint ventures with American steel 
firms. Japanese steel firms have preferred the more conservative 
policy of establishing joint ventures to building new plants. 
Since 1984 Japanese steel companies have invested close to $1 
billion in joint ventures in the U.S. In 1984, for example, NKK 
purchased 50 percent of National Steel. More recently, Nippon 
Steel has joined Inland Steel in building a highly advanced cold-
strip mill. Most of these investments are to produce high value 
added steel sheet for the automobile industry. In part Japanese 
steel producers are following their Japanese automotive industry 
customers into the American market, though they hope to sell to 
American car manufacturers as well. 
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Indeed, cold steel sheet provides a good illustration of the 
Japanese steel industry response to changing competitive 
conditions. Japanese firms spend three times as much on R and D 
as a percentage of sales as American firms. They have developed 
a superior anti-corrosive, strong, thin, light steel for 
automobile bodies, a technology and production capability 
American steel producers do not yet have. Despite yen 
appreciation and quota restraints, Japanese steel producers have 
been able to continue to export steel profitably to the United 
States by concentrating on new products with high value added, 
the dollar price of which can be increased as the yen 
appreciates. 
In addition to cost-cutting measures, another aspect of the 
Japanese steel industry's survival strategy is to develop high-
strength, high-quality products that require less steel tonnage. 
Because the NICs already have the technology and skilled labor 
force to produce ordinary steel products at competitive prices, 
Japanese firms are moving increasingly into specialty lines of 
business where advanced technology is required. Nagashima also 
stressed the importance Japanese steelmakers ascribe to close 
ties with major steel users. Accurate, current information as to 
customer needs allows the steel producers to deliver goods on a 
real-time basis, the system known as "kanban" in Japan. 
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Production cutbacks and increasing investment abroad have a 
potentially enormous impact on the labor force in the Japanese 
steel industry. But the steel manufacturers are searching for 
ways to reduce costs without resorting to massive layoffs. 
Employees in senior positions are encouraged to take early 
retirement, and fewer new recruits are hired. Moreover, steel 
firms are attempting to diversify by developing new lines of 
business, many in service areas, in order to absorb redundant 
white- and blue-collar workers. Nonetheless, it is unclear 
whether these measures will be sufficient to reduce the labor 
force in steel production of the magnitude forecasted. 
The Electronics Industry 
Electrical manufacturing is one of the most encompassing of 
industry categories; it covers a wide range of product 
categories, from consumer electronics such as television, VTRs 
and compact discs, to industrial electrical equipment ranging 
from huge generators to small motors, to new high tech industrial 
electronics areas of semiconductors, computers, instrumentation, 
and telecommunications. The Japanese industry, as in the United 
States, combines specialized manufacturers in certain product 
categories and lines and very large diversified manufacturers of 
a wide range of products. Hitachi is one such large producer. 
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Japan's electronics industry, President of Hitachi America 
Ltd. Tsuneo Tanaka pointed out, has been hard hit by the rising 
value of the yen because it has been heavily dependent on foreign 
sales for profits and growth. The stronger yen puts a squeeze on 
profits in large overseas markets, and subjects the industry to 
greater price competition from the newly industrialized countries 
as well. (See Table 9.) 
One response by the Japanese electronics industry has been 
to concentrate on more knowledge- and technology-intensive 
products and relinquish a number of labor-intensive market 
segments to lower-cost producers in Taiwan and Korea. Indeed 
Hitachi has been dramatically shifting the composition of its 
production, with semiconductors, computers, instrumentation and 
telecommunications equipment now amounting to 3 0 percent of 
sales, compared to 16 percent ten years ago. Tanaka expects the 
ratio to increase to almost 50 percent by 1995. 
A second strategy has been to increase direct foreign 
investment. The electronics industry, as other Japanese 
industries, had increased overseas investments in the 1960s, 
primarily in Southeast Asia, to overcome import barriers and to 
take advantage of cheaper labor. Beginning in the late 1970s, in 
response to the Orderly Marketing Agreement limiting the import 
of Japanese color television sets, Japanese firms began overseas 
production in North America and Europe of color televisions. 
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Stereos, and semiconductors soon followed. This trend toward 
increased production in foreign markets intensified in the 1980s, 
in part because of trade problems but increasingly to meet the 
custom designing and service needs in high-technology electronics 
which requires proximity to the customer. Hitachi's ratio of 
U.S. production to total U.S. sales, currently about 2 0 percent, 
is expected to increase to almost 40 percent by 1992; American 
employees are currently more than 4,000. 
Tanaka argued that Hitachi should "Americanize" by engaging 
in the full range of activities — from R and D, to production, 
to marketing — in the United States. He stressed that only by 
such an integrated operation could the company respond flexibly 
and rapidly to evolving customer needs. A discussant noted that 
Tanaka*s concerns are similar to those of many local managers of 
multi-national corporations, including American managers in 
Japan; namely need for greater knowledge and understanding by 
headquarters, more investment funds, and greater autonomy. 
Tanaka noted that yen appreciation and overseas investment 
by the Japanese electronics industry thus far has not contributed 
to unemployment in Japan because of the continuing strong growth 
of domestic demand and the corporate ability to develop and shift 
production to new products. While somewhat sanguine in the 
shorter-run, he suggested the Japanese electronics industry today 
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is in a position analagous to that of the steel industry a decade 
ago. 
It was noted that the high yen has not eliminated export 
profits in all electronic goods. Regarding Japanese 
semiconductor exports to the United States, the Department of 
Commerce under the semiconductor agreement sets floor prices in 
dollars on semiconductors which are presumed to represent 
Japanese costs of production, including overhead and profit. In 
practice prices have been sufficiently high that Japanese 
producers apparently are making considerable profits on their 
exports to the American market. This is also due to the current 
short supply of semiconductors driving up market prices. 
THREE APPRAISALS OF JAPAN'S RESTRUCTURING 
Certain empirical features and patterns of Japan's economic 
restructuring are apparent. Economists are in agreement that 
Japan's economic growth will no longer be export-led; growth will 
have to come from domestic demand expansion, private and public. 
The yen's appreciation has left Japan's export and import-
competing industries bereft of much of the price competitiveness 
they enjoyed between 1980 and 1985. Low cost producers in the 
NICs are vying for market share overseas where Japanese exporters 
once enjoyed a comparative advantage, as well as in Japan at the 
lower end of certain product lines. Over time Japan's trade and 
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current account surplus will decrease somewhat, in dollars and in 
yen, and especially as a percentage of GNP. 
Conference speakers, American and Japanese, agreed on the 
general contours of adjustment by Japanese companies and 
industries to the yen appreciation. At home Japanese 
manufacturers will continue to place great emphasis on (and faith 
in) technological innovation — R and D, new high-tech products, 
production automation — as the means to maintain competitiveness 
through more focused production. Many exporting firms will 
invest in production as well as assembly facilities abroad, 
taking advantage of their specific managerial and technological 
skills and marketing channels as well as lower labor costs and to 
bypass actual or threatened trade barriers. However, differences 
of opinion surfaced as to how far these processes would go and 
how effective they would be. 
While economists are of two schools, most Conference 
participants expect the yen to continue its upward course in the 
near to medium term because Japan's global trade surplus and 
bilateral surplus are taking so much time to be reduced to 
reasonable levels, even though the yen has already overshot its 
purchasing power parity value. One of the primary mechanisms by 
which Japan's exports to the U.S. will taper off is the 
establishment of Japanese production facilities in the U.S. 
However, there is a gestation time lag of several years between 
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the decision to invest in overseas plants and the diminution of 
exports from existing Japanese plants. Some observers, as 
already noted, are even sceptical that overseas production will 
supplant exports rather than add to them. The repatriated 
interest and profits from accumulating overseas portfolio and 
direct investment add to Japan's current account surplus, so that 
in time Japan's current account surplus will be substantially 
larger than its trade balance. 
Japan's economic restructuring process is still underway, 
and the projections of the evolving shape of the Japanese economy 
are subject to the variety of assumptions with which observers 
deal with future uncertainties. Prognoses nevertheless abound, 
along a continuum from optimistic on the one end to pessimistic 
on the other. We include here Table 10 which provides the major 
Japanese 1987 year-end forecasts for fiscal 1988. 
Table 10 Economic Forecasts for Fiscal 1988 
Real Current 
GNP Account Yen 
Growth Surplus Rate 
(%) (Bil.$) (To $) 
Japanese 
Government 3.8 72.0 
Banks 
Taiyo Kobe Bank 4.2 75.0 130.5 
Tokai Bank 4.0 60.0 130 
Yasuda Trust 4.0 78.5 130 
Fuji Bank 3.7 78.0 125 
Industrial Bank of 
Japan 3.6 81.3 13 0 
Chuo Trust 3.5 69.0 129.8 
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Mitsui Trust 3.5 68.2 130.2 
Mitsubishi Trust 3.5 60.2 130 
Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank 3.5 74.4 128.5 
Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank 3.2 73.5 127 
Bank of Tokyo 3.2 65.7 133 
Insurance Companies 
Sumitomo Life 3.8 85.7 13 0.3 
Asahi Mutual Life 3.7 79.1 129 
Meiji Mutual Life 3.7 71.8 125 
Nippon Life 3.4 81.6 125 
Research Organizations 
Research Institute of 
National Economy 4.3 77.3 128 
Daiwa Securities 
Research Institute 4.0 66.1 126.8 
Yamaichi Research 
Institute 3.8 68.8 133 
Japan Economic Research 
Center 3.7 75.5 124.4 
Okasan Economic 
Research Center 3.7 77.0 13 0 
Nomura Research 
Institute 3.6 75.1 12 3 
Nikko Research Center 3.6 70.0 130 
Cosmo Research Center 3.4 76.3 135.6 
Kansai Economic Research 
Center 3.3 86.9 13 0.1 
Mitsubishi Research 
Institute 3.2 84.5 12 3 
Average 3.6 74.4 128.7 
Source: The Japanese Economic Journal, (December 26, 1987), p. * 
Interestingly the range of growth rate estimates for Japan 
is substantially narrower than for the United States.2 We have 
grouped numerous views and observations about Japan's economic 
restructuring according to whether they assert that Japan's 
economy is indeed positively adjusting to market forces, is 
2
 New York Times, December 20, 1987, p. F4 
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forestalling adjustment, or is adjusting albeit slowly and 
asymmetrically. We have called these three somewhat arbitrary 
categories the optimistic, sceptical, and intermediate views. 
There are three key issues. First, how rapid will be 
Japan's GNP growth rate over the course of the industrial 
restructuring process? Growth is important not only in itself 
but because it creates demand and jobs and thereby eases the 
process of restructuring. Second, how much restructuring will 
actually take place? In what industries? How will it be 
accomplished? Will it lead to a "new protectionism" or indeed 
the persistence of traditional protectionism? How serious will 
unemployment problems be, nationally and locally? Third, to what 
degree and how rapidly will Japan's trade and current account 
surplus decrease globally and bilaterally with the United States? 
The Optimistic View 
Some are optimistic about Japan's ability to surmount the 
difficulties posed by its changing economic environment. Kosai 
argued cogently that Japan will successfully restructure its 
economy, utilizing the danger it currently faces as a stimulus 
for reform and a new basis for sustained growth for the remainder 
of the century. 
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Kosai enumerated five encouraging indices of Japan's 
economic performance. First, the Japanese economy has already 
adjusted in large measure to a stronger yen. Industries heavily 
dependent on domestic natural resources such as aluminum smelting 
and coal mining have been scaled back dramatically. Japan's 
total production of aluminum ingots, for example, will be 35,000 
tons in fiscal in 1987, the lowest volume since 1950. That 
compares with a peak output of 1,188,000 tons in fiscal 1977. A 
similar trend is apparent in the coal industry, though the 
scaling down process is somewhat slower as the government 
attempts to mitigate the local unemployment problems in often 
secluded mining districts. 
Labor-intensive industries such as shipbuilding and iron and 
steel are also reducing production as demand declines. The steel 
industry case has already been discussed. Japan's major 
shipbuilders will trim their shipbuilding capacity about 20 
percent and their work force by a third in fiscal 1987. 
Other industries such as the home electric appliance and 
automobile industries are reducing costs and averting foreign 
political pressure by shifting production overseas. According to 
Japanese Ministry of Finance statistics, foreign direct 
investment from Japan jumped to $22.3 billion in 1986, and rose a 
further 70 percent (annual rate) in the first half of 1987. While 
it is unclear when and to what degree Japan's overseas production 
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will reduce Japan's current account surplus, Wakasugi is 
convinced that a significant portion of Japanese exports will 
eventually be replaced by goods produced at plants in the foreign 
markets. 
Despite cost cutting adjustments and increased production 
abroad, corporate growth in Japan is strong. Manufacturing 
profits, which declined by 14.1 percent in fiscal 1985 and a 
further 29.1 percent in 1986, have turned the corner and are 
projected to increase by 13.6 percent in 1987. As Wakasugi 
noted, one of the positive effects of the stronger yen on the 
Japanese economy has been the fall in import prices in yen terms 
by 40 percent on average, and even more for oil, since 1985. 
This has reduced the input factor prices of raw materials, 
electricity, and parts for Japanese manufacturers. 
Second, Japan's import structure is rapidly changing. One 
of the perennial foreign complaints has been that such a small 
share of Japan's imports are manufactured goods. In 1987, 
however, the share of manufactured goods to total imports will 
reach about 45 percent, up from about 2 0 percent through the 
1970s. (See Table 11 and 12.) Economist Shin Yasunobe of MITI's 
Research Institute of International Trade and Industry noted 
that, for example, over 40 percent of calculators sold in Japan 
are imported, as are half the cameras, and a fifth of the watches 
and radios. Japan is entering a new pattern of horizontal 
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division of labor with its trading partners, at least with the 
NICs, of two-way trade in manufactures. 
The historical trade pattern of the Asian NICs was that they 
imported manufactured goods (particularly machinery and 
components for assembly) from Japan and exported to the United 
States. This is rapidly changing. In the third quarter of 1987, 
for example, Korea's exports to Japan measured in dollars were up 
47.6 percent over the same period in the previous year, and 
Taiwan's exports to Japan were up 56 percent. Imports from 
European countries have also increased, by 56.8 percent in 1986 
and 23.4 percent in the third quarter of 1987. These imports are 
mainly consumer goods. Manufactured goods imports from the 
United States, in large part industrial goods, rose much less 
rapidly — by 9.8 percent in 1986. 
Kosai suggested that this trend reflects the high income 
elasticity of manufactured goods (about 1.6) which is over three 
times that of raw materials (about 0.5). Although the increased 
imports into Japan would appear less dramatic when measured in 
yen, Kosai contends that the trend towards increased intra-
industry trade between Japan and some of its trade partners is 
clear and will persist. 
A third positive sign Kosai and others noted is the 
unexpectedly large expansion of Japan's domestic demand since the 
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first quarter of 1987. This trend stands in sharp contrast with 
the period between 1980 and 1985, when external demand buoyed 
sluggish domestic growth. Japanese GNP growth slowed 
substantially in 1986, under the high yen, to an annual rate of 
2.4 percent. It then surged dramatically in the first three 
quarters of 1987 at a (annualized) growth rate of 3.8 percent. 
Government statistics indicate that the rate of growth in real 
domestic demand in 1987 will be approximately 5 percent, while a 
one percentage point decline in net foreign trade will result in 
a GNP growth rate of about 4 percent. One sector bolstering 
domestic demand is the booming housing construction market; new 
starts are likely to exceed 1.65 million, up 18 percent from 1986 
and nearing the historical peak reached under Prime Minister 
Tanaka in 1973. While housing and construction activity will 
likely decelerate over the coming years, Kosai was confident that 
steady expansion would continue in the business equipment sector. 
A fourth encouraging feature is the Japanese government's 
strong fiscal position. The central government's tax revenues 
increased by 15 percent in the first half of fiscal year 1986 to 
produce a total in excess of 40 trillion yen for the government 
coffers. In addition, the privatization of Nippon Telegraph and 
Telecommunications (NTT) and sales of shares in the stock market 
have generated revenues of about 5 trillion yen so far, twice the 
sum originally projected by the Ministry of Finance. Further 
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revenues are expected from the privitization of and sale of the 
government's 35 percent share in Japan Air Lines. 
This increase in revenues gives the government greater 
freedom in choosing between the policy alternatives of fiscal 
reconstruction and expansion in the short to medium term. In the 
early 1980s fiscal policy was beset by a vicious cycle whereby 
fiscal austerity would result in fewer revenues, which would in 
turn worsen the budget deficit. Now a favorable cycle of 
economic growth and higher revenues has set in once again. 
A fifth point stressed by the optimists is Japan's continued 
success in averting a large unemployment problem in the wake of 
industrial restructuring. Japan's current unemployment rate of 3 
percent is rather high by historical standards, but a sharp 
increase to 5-6 percent is unlikely to occur. Of course, the 
unemployment figures do not include the underemployed, such as 
part time workers or retired persons who would prefer to be in 
the full time work force and middle-aged married females who 
simply withdraw from the labor force (as reported in the 
statistics). Furthermore unemployment in certain regions, 
notably Kyushu and Hokkaido where mining and heavy industries 
have been important, is somewhat greater than in Tokyo. But on 
average, unemployment remains quite low, and Kosai noted that as 
of July 1987 while employment had decreased by 240,000 in 
manufacturing over the previous year, total employment increased 
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by 410,000 due to strong employment growth in the service sector. 
As Japan's industrial restructuring proceeds and labor-
intensive industries continue to relocate overseas, the number of 
jobs in the manufacturing sector will not keep pace with the 
growing labor pool. The Japanese government's latest labor white 
paper stated with confidence that the economy will be able to 
cope smoothly with the transfer of an expected 2 million jobs 
from manufacturing to services by the year 2 000, mainly, 
presumably, through retirement and attrition. 
The Skeptical View 
Some observers view Japan's economic restructuring with a 
greater measure of skepticism, and hence reach different 
conclusions about the implications of the restructuring for Japan 
and its relations with the United States and the rest of the 
world. 
William Rapp, Executive Director of Corporate Finance at 
Bank of America's Tokyo office, stressed that there remain 
important other sectors of the Japanese economy that are 
adjusting very little if at all. Large firms dependent on export 
markets have been adjusting to a higher yen rate because they 
have no choice in order to survive. Other sectors, however, 
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continue to be insulated from international competitive forces. 
The agricultural sector, paper and wood processing, petroleum 
refining, cement, building materials and construction, as well as 
the communication and transportation services are examples of 
protected segments of the Japanese economy. Rapp terms this 
bifurcation between the efficient and inefficient sectors "the 
new dualism", distinguishing it from the traditional concept of 
dualism between large and small business enterprises. 
There are essentially three ways in which Japanese 
insulation from the world market might persist. First, the 
government may continue its policies of protecting Japanese 
producers, both directly and indirectly. Louis Laun, Assistant 
Secretary for International Economic Policy of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, stressed that Japanese government 
policies for industrial restructuring have effects on trade, and 
hence are trade as well as industrial policy issues. He 
recognized it is natural for any country to want to ease 
adjustment in depressed industries with the minimal amount of 
economic dislocation, a policy the Japanese government has been 
pursuing for the past decade at least. 
However, Laun expressed concern that three recent subsidized 
loan programs will, in their implementation, be used to keep 
uncompetitive firms in business, helping them to maintain exports 
or deter imports. He posited that Japan's 1978 and 1983 
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depressed industries laws and programs had in many sectors 
resulted in far less capacity reduction, and fewer imports, than 
would have occurred under a free market adjustment process. This 
gives cause for concern about the new programs. The total amount 
of subsidized loans under the three programs instituted since 
1985 is about $5 billion. In December 1985, the Japanese 
government announced a policy to lend money to smaller firms in 
151 designated industries suffering from depressed demand or 
structural recession. In September 1986 the government extended 
the first loan policy and undertook new measures for small and 
medium sized firms in specially designated regions to help 
promote structural adjustment. In February 1987 the government 
announced a small loan program for larger firms in selected 
regions facing particularly bad economic conditions. The United 
States government is concerned that the criteria for support are 
not clear, that the programs may become more or less permanent, 
and that they may provide the basis for more comprehensive 
government support programs of yen-affected industries, thereby 
reducing or even offsetting the exchange rate effects. The 
concern is that, despite Japanese government announcements, these 
ameliorative programs will be neither capacity-reducing nor 
temporary. 
A discussant from the floor asked whether these Japanese 
policies for industrial restructuring were more effective and 
more fair than United States policies of helping major American 
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industries in trouble — such as steel, automobiles, and some 
consumer electronics — by protecting them from import 
competition through negotiations with the governments of Japan 
and other countries "voluntarily" to restrict exports of those 
products to the United States. Laun indicated that while these 
may be necessary measures under the circumstances, particularly 
in a period of an overvalued dollar, they are not desirable 
instruments of trade or industrial policy in a more ideal 
setting. He stressed the importance of exchange rate changes as 
the major macroeconomic tool to restructure trade and reduce the 
huge imbalances. He argued that such an approach is far 
preferable in all countries to protectionism, managed trade, 
expanded export subsidies or other self-defeating ways to attempt 
to solve balance of payments imbalances. 
A second type of insulation from market forces are business 
practices and institutional arrangements that may have the 
consequence, intended or not, of hindering foreign competition. 
Japan's multi-layered distribution system, for example, is not 
the result of a concerted policy by either government or 
business, but it nevertheless skims margins from imported goods 
and fails to pass all the price adjustment from the stronger yen 
to the consumer. While not illegal, Laun noted that it reduces 
the level of consumer demand for foreign products and hence 
impedes the reduction of Japan's trade surplus. Other examples 
of business practices that may have the unintended result of 
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reducing foreign competition in various sectors of the economy 
are relationship banking, stable cross share holding, and close 
firm-supplier ties. 
Natural barriers comprise a third type of insulation from 
market winds. Nontraded services produced and consumed 
domestically, such as domestic transportation, communications, 
and utilities, by their very nature have no effective competition 
from abroad. While these services are not traded and hence do 
not figure into Japan's current account directly, they raise 
input costs for domestic users. The cost of electricity in 
Japan, for instance, is approximately 13 yen per kilowatt-hour, 
compared to the world average of about 4 to 5 yen per kilowatt-
hour. If Japan remains a high cost provider of nontraded 
services important in the production process, Japanese 
manufacturing firms will have greater difficulty than often 
assumed in adjusting to a higher yen value. 
Those who believe that many sectors in Japan somehow enjoy 
effective protection are skeptical that real intra-industry trade 
between Japan and its partners is developing. While they 
acknowledge that Japan is beginning to import more manufactured 
goods, they contend that manufactured imports tend to be only in 
low-technology or luxury segments of the market and there is 
still no trend towards reciprocal trade in similar products as 
there is between the U.S. and Europe. One discussant noted that 
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Japan imports cheap watches from Hong Kong, simple steel products 
from Korea, or luxury cars from Germany, for example, but it 
still does not import a large amount of manufactured goods that 
are in direct competition with domestic production. 
Others expressed reservations about Kosai's forecast. One 
key concern is whether domestic demand and GNP growth will be 
sustained. Skeptics are concerned that private demand will not 
grow so rapidly, and that adequate further government stimulus 
through tax cuts or expenditure increases will not be forthcoming 
in 1988 and subsequent years. The quality of current 
manufacturing profits was sharply questioned by one discussant, 
who noted that much may be the result of successful financial 
speculation in booming stock and land markets until fall 1987, 
yielding gains not likely to be repeated and making low the level 
of profits actually generated through manufacturing activities. 
Moreover, speculative excess in both stock and land markets, and 
their interplay, may result in a further sharp decline and hard 
landing in their prices with adverse effects at least in the 
short run. Similarly to some extent the extraordinary increase 
in tax revenues derives from capital gains taxes on land and 
transactions taxes on the extraordinary turnover of securities in 
the stock and bond markets in 1987. Will these revenue sources 
persist? 
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The most pessimistic expressed concern was that the 
aggregate figures on unemployment belie the actual shifts in 
labor by firms and regions, which may become significant enough 
to put severe pressure on the permanent employment system. For 
example, if high-wage Japanese workers are de facto laid off, 
what will be the quality and wages of the jobs they find in the 
service sector? Will automobile production be reduced sharply in 
Japan? If so, employment problems, perhaps even more among parts 
manufacturers than the eleven large assembly firms, will become 
severe. How will they be re-absorbed into the economy? Moreover 
textiles, one of the largest employers of labor in Japan, now 
faces severe competition from rapidly rising imports. Where will 
those displaced workers go? In sum, the employment difficulties 
of restructuring may indeed provoke much more of a crisis than 
any of the panelists articulated. 
An Intermediate View 
It is usually easy and often sensible to take a position 
between the optimistic and pessimistic ends of the spectrum, and 
indeed that is where we are. Our intermediate view reflects our 
uncertainties — our hope that relatively rapid growth will 
persist and adjustment of the industrial structure will proceed 
smoothly, our fears that the current growth spurt is ephemeral 
and that adjustment has only begun and will prove quite 
difficult. Frankly we were surprised by the mood of cautious 
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optimism conveyed by the Japanese panelists. The sense of crisis 
in Japan, so pervasive in early 1987, seems to have been 
dissipated by better than expected domestic growth, an only 
modest decline in export volumes, and less severe problems of 
unemployment than had been feared. The new mood at its most 
modest reflects the feeling that somehow Japan anyway handles its 
problems better than others do, and at its most optimistic, 
visualizes Japan as successfully making the transition to a new 
era of growth founded on high tech industries and services in a 
new, "information society." 
We remain more cautious. Restructuring of the Japanese 
economy will take place but it will take time and it may not be 
as thorough-going as the optimists apparently anticipate. The 
GNP growth rate over the next several years may be in the 2.5-3 
percent range. Protection of some sectors will persist as an 
ongoing problem. Export industries will continue under pressure 
of a high yen value. We think it quite possible that sectoral 
and regional problems of unemployment will worsen before they get 
better. 
It is unlikely that heretofore competitive Japanese export 
industries will soon get a respite from the strong yen. Interest 
and dividends on Japan's rapidly growing net foreign assets, now 
the largest net creditor position in the world, will contribute 
to the current account surplus and put further pressure on the 
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yen to appreciate. Further, any Japanese investor move away from 
dollar-denominated foreign assets will strengthen the yen vis a 
vis the dollar. It remains to be seen what industries and what 
firms will be able to export from Japan profitably over the 
longer haul by sufficiently cutting costs, increasing 
productivity, and successfully commercializing new innovations. 
Yen appreciation has put severe competitive pressures on 
domestic industries directly competing with imports. Important 
sectors remain protected, as already noted, in Japan's new "dual 
economy." The forces, at home and abroad, for liberalization are 
met by strong domestic political counterforces. The areas least 
likely to change rapidly are in nontraded sectors such as 
domestic utilities, transportation and communication, and 
distribution; and the agriculture sector because of its strong 
political clout. But there will be strong, if indirect, 
pressure on these areas as well. Users of domestic services 
will press more intensively for lower-cost inputs as the stronger 
yen makes disparities between domestic and foreign cost 
structures more obvious. This will be particularly true if the 
yen strengthens further and makes the high domestic prices of 
important inputs even more onerous. Exporters will also increase 
their demands that domestic agricultural markets be opened, not 
because these products affect the exporters' cost functions but 
because the closure of Japan's agricultural sector generates 
trade friction that is directed in part at Japanese exporters. 
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It remains to be seen whether the Japanese government, as part of 
its restructuring program, will seriously tackle its remaining 
significant import barriers, politically so sensitive. 
Structural adjustment brings inevitable economic, social, 
and personal human costs. To date those costs have turned out to 
be, overall, less severe than earlier feared. In our view the 
government's ameliorative programs have done little to retard the 
effects of yen appreciation, if only because the amounts involved 
are thus far quite modest. (Note that a subsidy of 2 percentage 
points below market rates on loans of $5 billion is $100 million 
a year.) Government assistance to beleagered export and import-
competing industries in most cases is provisional and partial. 
We do not yet have evidence to determine whether or not assisted 
firms are adjusting positively and flexibly through 
rationalization and shifting to new products and activities, or 
are indeed persisting in previous patterns. There is, 
nonetheless, concern that the Japanese government will negotiate 
VERs on rapidly-growing imports of textiles and other labor-
intensive products from developing countries. That would be a 
dangerous step backwards in itself and as a possible precedent 
for future Japanese actions. A great potential danger is that 
Japan as a developed country will invoke the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA) on textiles and establish country-by-country 
import quotas; it is the only industrial country not to apply the 
MFA to textile imports. Future Japanese import policies in 
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textiles, steel, and even automobiles will no doubt be monitored 
carefully. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. AND THE WORLD 
The three views we have just explicated differ for the most 
part only in degree because the trend towards reduced Japanese 
exports and increased imports is clear. Nonetheless the 
projections of each view for Japan's relations with its trading 
partners differ enough to merit some elaboration. Much has to do 
with how far and how rapidly Japan's trade and current account 
surpluses decline, although this was not an issue directly 
addressed in much detail at the Conference. 
The implications of the optimistic scenario of Japan's 
restructuring are encouraging. If the shift in output and 
employment from inefficient to efficient sectors of the economy 
proceeds as smoothly as the optimists suggest, productivity will 
increase and wages will rise in Japan, thus stimulating domestic 
demand and maintaining sustained domestic-based GNP growth. 
Manufactured goods imports will continue to rise dramatically as 
yen appreciation have made them highly price competitive. 
Exports will not grow but exporting firms will adjust and adapt, 
not wither away. At the same time, the temporary overshooting of 
the yen will further bolster imports and slow exports until 
Japan's current account balance is reduced sufficiently, after 
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which there will be some modest depreciation of the yen. The 
U.S. and Europe will refrain from levying trade protectionist 
measures against Japan, Japan will continue its ongoing process 
of market opening, and the welfare of trading nations will be 
ensured by the continuing discipline of the free market, 
multilateral trading system. 
The skeptics do not foresee the Japanese economy adjusting 
nearly so positively to the changing economic environment, but 
rather trying to shield itself from market forces to the extent 
possible. They contend that the Japanese government and/or the 
private sector will succeed in continuing to block much of the 
effect of the strong yen on many domestic industries and impede 
the process of reallocation of resources into efficient sectors 
of the economy. Uncompetitive sectors will act as a drag on the 
more efficient sectors. Japan's domestic demand is therefore 
unlikely to be sufficient to maintain good domestic growth. In 
the pessimistic scenario particular inefficient domestic 
industries will persist despite the ever greater competitiveness 
of their foreign counterparts. Trade friction will continue to 
be intense as long as Japan's current account surplus fails to 
diminish. 
There are two main issues. Will Japan's economic growth 
performance be rapid enough to contribute significantly to the 
growth of the world economy? And, will Japan's global and 
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important bilateral trade and current account surpluses decrease 
enough to dissuade the United States and other foreign 
governments from raising protectionist barriers against Japan 
(and, by implication, other nations)? 
Sustained, rapid growth is clearly beneficial for the 
Japanese people. It raises wages, incomes, standards of living. 
It makes the structural adjustment process less onerous. It also 
benefits the world economy as Japan imports more. However, the 
Japanese economy is not large enough to serve as the world's 
growth locomotive alone; much depends on the growth performance 
of the United States, West Germany, and the European Community as 
a whole. 
Japan's trade surplus is likely to shrink even if domestic 
growth is slow because yen appreciation has shifted relative 
prices of imports and exports between Japan and the rest of the 
world so greatly. These price effects brought Japan's reliance 
on export-led growth to a halt in 1986, and have made trade a 
negative factor in domestic demand in 1987 and for the next 
several years. These price effects show up particularly in 
Japan's trade balance measured in yen terms. In dollar terms 
Japan's 1987 trade and current account surplus will be slightly 
below 1986. 
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The United States is by far Japan's most important trading 
partner, not only in size of trade flows but because of the 
preeminent position of the United States in the world economic 
system, and because of the continuing intensity of bilateral 
trade frictions. The U.S. government has pursued a 
confrontational mode of bilateral negotiations, in frustration 
with the huge bilateral U.S. trade deficit with Japan (one third 
of the immense U.S. global trade deficit), and with continuing 
inability to overcome Japanese recalcitrance to provide adequate 
market access in sectors in which American producers are highly 
competitive but which Japanese protection persists due to 
politically powerful domestic interests. 
There is no easy solution to the overall Japan-U.S. trade 
problem. Rapid Japanese growth has only a limited direct effect 
on exports to Japan; the indirect effect of increased U.S. 
exports to countries exporting to Japan is probably substantially 
larger. Japanese yen appreciation and structural adjustment will 
have a significantly greater direct effect; they will reduce 
Japan's exports to the United States more than imports from it. 
Japan's manufactured goods imports, like America's, will 
increasingly be labor-intensive consumer goods from low wage 
developing countries. Three patterns will characterize changes 
in Japan's exports to the United States: Japanese export 
producers will shift production to the United States through 
direct investment (automobiles and parts, machine tools, steel); 
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Japanese export producers will lose the U.S. market to NIC 
exporters such as Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Mexico, though they 
will sell them high tech components (consumer electronics); and 
U.S. producers will take back American market share from Japanese 
and other foreign producers. One key sector will be automobiles, 
trucks, and parts, since it is such a large share of U.S. imports 
from Japan. The degree to which Japanese producers assemble in 
the United States and use parts manufactured in the United States 
is probably the single largest factor determining the bilateral 
trade balance. 
Yen appreciation has made American producers much more cost 
competitive vis a vis their Japanese competitors. The Pacific 
Basin economies have benefited from the weakening of the dollar 
that has presented Japan with such difficulties because their 
currencies are tied to the dollar. Their exports to the U.S. 
have not been hurt and have even increased in substitution for 
Japanese exports to the U.S., and exports to Japan have increased 
as the yen has appreciated. To the extent that the Pacific Basin 
economies increase their imports commensurate with export 
increases, they and the world are better off. While this is by 
and large what has happened, the major exception is Taiwan which 
has been running major excessive current account surpluses, and 
to a lesser degree Korea. Both will come under increasing 
pressure to appreciate their exchange rate and to liberalize 
imports, much as Japan has. The problem for the U.S. is that the 
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dollar must decline on a trade-weighted basis not simply vis a 
vis the yen. To the extent that production shifts from Japan to 
other economies tied to the dollar, the beneficial relative price 
effect on the U.S. trade deficit will not occur. 
What it takes to defuse the political tension on the 
American side of the bilateral trade relationship is unclear. 
Will a substantial decline in Japan's global trade surplus alone 
be sufficient? Probably not. A substantial decline solely in 
the bilateral imbalance? Probably not, though better. A 
combination of a reduction of Japan's global surplus and 
bilateral surplus with the United States? That would go much 
further, but is not clear that would be sufficient. To the 
extent that the deepest U.S. political concern is the U.S. global 
trade deficit, then even reductions in Japan's surpluses may be 
insufficient. If so, there is little more Japan could do; the 
rest is up to the United States. As Laun stressed, bilateral and 
global trade imbalances reflect wide-ranging structural 
difficulties in both the United States and Japan — at the 
macroeconomic level, at the corporate and industry level, and in 
government policies. 
It will take time to address and to solve these structural 
problems in both countries. The relative prices (the yen-dollar 
exchange rate) are more or less right. The question now is 
whether domestic demand can be adequately managed, namely 
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increase in Japan and decrease in the U.S. Japan has its 
industrial restructuring process underway. The U.S. joint 
Administration and Congressional decision in November 1987 to 
reduce the Federal budget deficit in the next two years is a 
major step forward. The remaining question is whether the United 
States will indeed succeed in reducing its trade deficit through 
an industrial renaissance, or whether it will become impatient 
with the pace of change through market forces and attempt to 
reduce its global, and bilateral, trade deficits by imposing 
import restrictions. 
Table 1 Japan's Exports 
(billions of U.S. $) 
To U.S. To World 
1980 31.367 126.736 
1981 38.609 149.522 
1982 36.330 137.663 
1983 42.829 145.468 
1984 59.937 168.290 
1985 65.278 175.638 
1986 80.456 205.591 
1987 83.579 229.228 
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys, Japan. November 1986; and Nikkei 
Telecom 
Table 2 Japan's Imports 
Yen Value % Change 
(bil. Y) 
Dollar Value % Change % Manf. 
(bil. $) 
1980 29,153 29.3% 140.5 2.76% 22.9 
1981 29,499 1.2 143.3 2.0 24.3 
1982 30,656 3.8 131.9 -8.0 24.9 
1983 30,015 -8.1 126.4 -4.2 27.2 
1984 32,321 7.7 136.5 8.0 32.1 
1985 31,085 -3.8 129.5 -5.1 31.0 
1986 21,551 -30.7 126.4 -2.4 41.8 
1987/ 
1st half NA NA 68.9 9.0 
(annualized) 
42.8 
Source: Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics; and MITI White 
Paper on International Trade 



















1980 -10.75 -2,577.2 9.1 4.3 -1.1 
1981 4.77 1,147.0 14.1 3.7 0.4 
1982 6.8 1,774.6 15.8 3.1 0.6 
1983 20.8 4,960.3 18.3 3.2 1.8 
1984 35.0 8,350.3 37.7 5.1 2.7 
1985 49.2 11,517.6 45.2 4.9 3.7 
1986 85.8 14,178.6 55.9 2.4 4.2 
1987/ 43.5 
1st half 
6,454.1 NA 3.6 3.8 
Source: Nikkei Telecom 
Surplus w/U.S. Rate Surplus/GNP 
Table 4 Share of steel, autos, and electrical 
manufacturing in the growth of exports* 
Iron and Steel Autos Electrical Manf. 
To U.S. To World To U.S. To World To U.S. To World 
1980 NA 5.0% 35.8% 23.4% 14.1% 19.1% 
1981 22.9 5.5 29.7 14.6 31.6 26.9 
1982 -16.3 7.8 18.9 14.9 23.7 21.7 
1983 24.5 -34.6 31.1 19.3 26.0 54.9 
1984 7.2 4.6 17.4 15.9 38.1 35.1 
1985 -10.1 -5.2 81.8 82.5 -2.0 8.4 
1986 -0.3 -2.6 27.5 24.8 NA NA 
*"Share of steel in the growth of exports" for any given year is 
calculated [steel exports in year(x) - steel exports in year (x • 
1)] / [total exports in year (x) - total exports in year (x-1)]. 
The same formula was used for the other industries and for 
exports to the U.S. market. Calculations were done from dollar-
based statistics. 
Sources: Japan Economic Institute "Statistical Profile, Part 
II," September 4, 1987; Nikkei Telecom; and MITI White Paper on 
International Trade. 
Table 5 Share of s teel. autos. and electrical 
manufacturing in Jan anese exports 
Steel Autos Electrical Manf. 
1985 
To U.S. To World 
4.9% 7.7% 




To U.S. To World 
23.0% 12.7% 
1986 3.0 6.1 53.0 20.4 NA 13.8 
1987 2.9 2.6 
1st half 
52.4 19.1 NA 14.1 
Sources: 
Trade. 
: Nikkei Telecom and MITI White Paper on International 
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1980 NA 21,282 5,243 728 
1981 700 23,789 5,794 723 
1982 696 24,143 6,050 840 
1983 699 25,451 6,193 813 
1984 722 27,692 7,045 1,019 
1985 765 31,521 8,181 1,206 
1986 752 31,330 7,204 897 
1987 753 31,613 3,247 667 
* Export figures include cars, trucks, and buses. 
** Profit figures are fiscal year pretax profits for the top 
twelve producers of motor vehicles and sixteen producers of motor 
vehicle parts. 
Source: Nikkei Telecom, Bank of Japan, Business Analysis of Main 
Enterprises in Japan, and Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics 









1980 433 17,896 3,069.2 283 
1981 422 17,227 3,665.5 203 
1982 417 17,447 3,885.1 131 
1983 407 16,073 3,050.5 -8 
1984 396 17,298 3,282.2 163 
1985 388 17,754 3,259.7 120 
1986 369 14,782 2,159.9 -42 
1987/ 
1st half 
354 6,731 1,019 108 
*The profits are calculated on a fiscal year basis and include 
profits from only Japan's 25 largest steel makers. 
Sources: Nikkei Telecom, the Ministry of Finance Trade 
Statistics, and the Bank of Japan. 









1980 1,620 22,160 2,918.1 760 
1981 1,745 25,693 3,486.1 940 
1982 1,785 27,646 3,621.3 1,117 
1983 1,932 31,729 4,132.5 1,226 
1984 2,156 39,042 5,334.9 1,662 
1985 2,214 40,842 5,346.7 1,235 
1986 2,230 NA 4,915.1 736 
1987/ 
1st half 
NA NA 2,355.4 NA 
* Profit figures are fiscal year pretax profits of the top 27 
manufacturers of electrical machinery in 1980, the top 29 in 
1981, and the top 45 electrical machinery manufacturers 
thereafter. 
Sources: Nikkei Telecom and Bank of Japan, Business Analysis of 
Main Enterprises in Japan 
Table 11 Composition of Japanese Imports by Type 
1986 First half 1987 
Total Amount, $bil. $12 6.4 $68.3 
Food Stuff 15.2% 14.9% 
Raw Materials 13.9% 14.5% 
Mineral Fuels 29.2% 27.4% 
Chemicals 7.7% 8.2% 
Machinery and 
Equipment 11.6% 12.5% 
Other Products 22.4% 22.5% 
Source: Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics 
Table 12 Composition of Japanese Imports of 
Manufactured Goods, by Origin 
1986 First half 1987 
Total Amount, $bil. $52.78 $29.51 
United States 33.4% 27.3% 
Germany 7.8% 9.2% 
United Kingdom 6.1% 3.9% 
France 2.9% 3.4% 
Asian NICs* 13.6% 16.5% 
ASEAN* 4.0% 4.4% 
China 3.7% 4.3% 
Others 28.5% 31.0% 
*"Asian NICs" here include Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. "ASEAN" 
comprises Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines. 
Source: Ministry of Finance Trade Statistics 
